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EVIDENCE-Impeachment of Witnesses-Evidence of Indictment
Is Admissible to Show Motive, Bias or Interest of a
Witness Not a Party to the Prosecution
Evans v. State,

519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
Co-defendants Evans and Meyers were tried on separate indictments for
the murder of a convenience food store operator. The State's principal witness, Knock, at the time of the trial was under felony indictment for sodomy.
The defendants offered the sodomy indictment as evidence to show the
bias, prejudice, interest, and motive of the testifying witness. This evidence was not offered to impeach the character of the witness, but to establish an inference of undue pressure due to the pending indictment.' The
State objected, arguing that only final convictions are admissible for impeach2
ment of a witness under Article 38.29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
This objection was sustained. 'Held-Reversedand remanded. Evidence of
pending charges against a witness is admissible under certain circumstances
for the limited purpose of showing bias, prejudice, interest, and motive of
a witness. 3
The adversary system of adjudication is one of the major cornerstones of
the Anglo-American system of justice. One of its striking characteristics is
1. Brief for Appellant, Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
The Appellant attempted to show that Knock's case had been carefully set and reset by
the State in order that it would continue to hang over Knock's head until he had testified
against Appellant and Meyer. Id. at 12-14.
2. Tax. CoDE CRiM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.29 (1966) states:
The fact that a defendant in a criminal case, or a witness in a criminal case, is
or has been, charged by an indictment, information or complaint, with the commission of an offense against the criminal laws of this State, of the United States, or
any other State shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of any criminal
case for the purpose of impeaching any person as a witness unless on trial under
such indictment, information or complaint a final conviction has resulted, or a suspended sentence has been given and has not been set aside, or such a person has
been placed on probation and the period of probation has not expired. In trials of
defendants under Article 36.09, it may be shown that the witness is presently
charged with the same offense as the defendant at whose trial he appears as a witness.
3. Evans v. State, 519 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). The scope
of the Evans decision is limited to witnesses who are not a party to the prosecution.
Article 38.29 presently allows introduction of charges for bias impeachment only in the
case of trials of defendants under article 36.09. It provides that if a witness is an accomplice to a crime, and he was testifying at the trial of his co-defendant, either in support of the State or his co-defendant, it can be shown that the witness is charged with
the same offense as the other defendant. McWilliams v. State, 496 S.W.2d 630, 633
(Tex. Crim. App. 1973); accord, Burkhalter v. State, 493 S.W.2d 214, 217-18 n.2 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1973).
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the right of counsel to impeach the credibility of an opponent's witness. 4
This right is guaranteed by the sixth amendment right of confrontation, and
is accomplished in a criminal proceeding by cross-examination of adverse witnesses. The purpose of impeachment is to suggest to the jury that the
witness' testimony is unworthy of belief.P
Generally, a witness' credibility may be attacked by several methods. 6 It
may be shown that on previous occtisions he has made statements inconsistent
with his present testimony. 7 Another method is to show the witness' incapacity to properly observe, remember, or recount the matters about which
he testified." Counsel may offer proof by other witnesses that material facts
are other than as testified to by the witness under attack, 9 or that the moral
character of the witness makes his testimony doubtful.' 0 Finally, impeachment may be accomplished by showing bias, interest, or motive on the part
of the witness to falsify his testimony." The purpose of these different attacks is not to strike the witness' testimony from the record, but to enable
2
the jury to weigh his credibility from the evidence presented.1
Criminal records may be introduced into evidence when either character
or bias impeachment is used.' 3 Character impeachment permits counsel to
discredit the witness by showing the possibility of false testimony because of
the witness' bad character as a convicted felon.' 4 Bias impeachment, how4. Comment, Credibility Impeachment by Prior Conviction, 36 Mo. L. REV. 472
(1971).
5. Impeachment is a common courtroom practice which has been substituted for
the incompetency standards used to exclude witnesses at common law. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 61, at 139 (2d ed. 1972).
6. Id. § 33, at 66.
7. E.g., Sierra v. State, 476 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971); Davis v.
State, 125 Tex. Crim. 131, 66 S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (1933). See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS EVIDENCE § 687-98, at 531-49 (2d ed. 1956).
8. E.g., Bryant v. State, 471 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (poor witness
memory); Taliaferro v. State, 143 Tex. Crim. 243, 245, 158 S.W.2d 493, 494 (1942)
(intoxicated at time of crime). See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TExAS EVIDENCE § 663-69, at 510-13 (2d ed. 1956).
9. Ratliff v. State, 165 Tex. Crim. 573, 575, 309 S.W.2d 242, 243 (1958); accord,
Thrash v. State, 500 S.W.2d 834, 835-36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Contra, Gatson v.
State, 387 S.W.2d 65, 68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (witness not permitted to be impeached because matter collateral to issue). See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY,
TEXAS EVIDENCE § 682-86, at 525-30 (2d ed. 1956).
10. E.g., Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (final con-

viction); Ulmer v. State, 106 Tex. Crim. 349, 351, 292 S.W. 245, 246 (1927) (proof
that truth and veracity are bad is admissible). See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R.
RAY, TEXAS EVIDENCE § 644-62, at 487-509 (2d ed. 1956).
11. E.g., Jackson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 864, 867-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (racial
bias); Barr v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 652, 654, 83 S.W.2d 998, 999 (1935) (motive).
See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS EVIDENCE § 670-81, at 514-25 (2d
ed. 1956).
12. 5 MEMPHIS ST. U.L. REV. 137, 138 (1974).
13. See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, §§ 40, 43,
at 80, 84 (2d ed. 1972).
14. See Cousins v. State, 185 A.2d 488, 489 n.1 (Md. Ct. App. 1962). See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS EVIDENCE § 644, at 487 (2d ed. 1956).
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ever, is used to show that the testimony of the witness should be doubted,
not because of the witness' general character, but because of his bias, interest
or motive in the outcome. 15 In jurisdictions which allow character impeachment only by evidence of a final conviction, it has been held that the mere
fact a witness has been charged with a crime is subject to inquiry where his
testimony might be influenced by interest, bias, or a motive to testify falsely.1
The primary reason behind allowing such liberal cross-examination is to expose the jury to the fact that the witness can be influenced by the expectation or hope that by aiding in the conviction of the defendant, he will be
17
granted immunity or leniency when he himself comes before the court.
As early as 1874 Texas courts considered it improper to impeach the
character of a witness by asking if he had ever been incarcerated.18 In
Lights v. State,19 however, Texas adopted the liberal view permitting im20
peachment of a witness' character with evidence of arrests or indictments.
This decision aligned Texas with the minority jurisdictions 2' which held it
permissible upon cross-examination to show that the witness had been arrested, indicted, or confined in prison even though a conviction had not
occurred. 22 Subsequently, this rule was refined so that a2 mere arrest, without
legal charges, was insufficient for impeachment purposes. 1
15. See People v. Garcia, 232 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Ill. Ct. App. 1967); Tachini v.
State, 59 Tex. Crim. 55, 59, 126 S.W. 1139, 1141 (1910). See generally 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TExAs EVIDENCE § 670, at 514 (2d ed. 1956).
16. United States v. Baker, 494 F.2d 1262, 1266-67 (6th Cir. 1974); United States
v. Hykel, 461 F.2d 721, 728 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Bonanno, 430 F.2d 1060,
1062 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 964 (1970); Hughes v. United States, 427 F.2d
66, 68 (9th Cir. 1970); Stephens v. State, 40 So. 2d 90, 92 (Ala. 1949); People v. Gibbs,
63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (Ct. App. 1968); People v. King, 498 P.2d 1142, 1144-45 (Colo.
1972); People v. Barr, 280 N.E.2d 708, 710 (Ill.. 1972); State v. Tate, 469 P.2d 999,
1003 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
17. State v. Alston, 195 S.W.2d 314, 315 (N.C. Ct. App. 1973). See also Annot.,
62 A.L.R.2d 610, 624 (1958). In some instances a defendant may even introduce evidence of pending charges to show the bias, interest or motive of a witness even though
the prosecution has not given the witness the slightest basis for such belief or hope.
Spaeth v. United States, 232 F.2d 776, 778-79 (6th Cir. 1956); State v. Reynolds, 449
P.2d 614, 615 (Ariz. 1969); People v. Pantages, 297 P. 890, 897 (Cal. 1931); Morrell
v. State, 297 So. 2d 579, 580 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (absolute right); State v.
Brooks, 513 S.W.2d 168, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974); State v. Tate, 469 P.2d 999, 1003
(Wash. Ct. App. 1970).
18. State v. Ivey, 41 Tex. 35, 38 (1874).
19. 21 Tex. Ct. App. 308, 17 S.W. 428 (1886).
20. Id. at 313, 17 S.W. at 429. Although the court spoke only of inquiries of incarceration, Lights represented the expansion of cross-examination to almost any matter
that would impair the credibility of a witness.
21. See State v. King, 378 P.2d 147, 154 (Kan. 1963); State v. Keen, 41 So. 2d
223, 225-26 (La. 1949); Ryan v. State, 36 S.W. 930, 931 (Tenn. 1896); Moore v. State,
152 Tex. Crim. 312, 315, 213 S.W.2d 844, 845 (1948); People v. Hite, 33 P. 254 (Utah
1893). See also Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1421 (1951). All jurisdictions now require final
convictions for character impeachment purposes.
22. Carroll v. State, 32 Tex. Crim. 431, 435-36, 24 S.W. 100, 102 (1893). See generally Chandler, Attacking Credibility of Witnesses by Proof of Charge or Conviction
of Crime, 10 TExAs L. REV. 257 (1932).
23. Gray v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. 682, 685, 65 S.W.2d 319, 320 (1933); Criner
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The minority viewpoint toward character impeachment prevailed in Texas
for 65 years after the Lights decision. 24 In 1951, the Texas Legislature
recognized the absence of a statute which precluded the use of an indictment,
information, or complaint to impeach a witness. 23 Therefore, the legislators
enacted Article 732(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 26 With the
passage of this article and its early judicial interpretation, Texas adopted the

majority view permitting only final convictions to impeach character. 27 After the adoption of article 732(a) and its amendment as article 38.2928 in
1965, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals consistently followed this rule

of evidence, 29 subject however, to the requirements that the conviction be for
a felony offense or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, neither of which
can be too remote.3 0

Although the courts previously have allowed great latitude in showing any

34
33
32
31
fact which would tend to establish ill feeling, bias, motive, or interest
on the part of a testifying witness, Texas, unlike the majority of jurisdic-

v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 226, 228, 229 S.W. 860, 861 (1921); Lasater v. State, 88 Tex.
Crim. 452, 456, 227 S.W. 949, 951 (1920) (mere arrests not shown to be legal charges
by a complaint, information or indictment cannot be used for impeachment purposes).
24. See, e.g., Terry v. State, 142 Tex. Crim. 454, 456, 154 S.W.2d 473, 474-76
(1941); Eaves v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 460, 29 S.W.2d 339, 341 (1929) (permissible
to use indictments for impeachment purposes so long as they did not arise out of the
same criminal transaction charged); cf. Moore v. State, 152 Tex. Crim. 312, 315, 213
S.W.2d 844, 845 (1948) (defendant testified in his own behalf).
25. Tex. Laws 1951, ch. 458, § 3, at 814.
26. TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art. 732(a) (1951). The language of article 732(a) is
the same as that of article 38.29 with the exception that article 38.29 added the provision
concerning trial of defendants under article 36.09.
27. Urban v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 106, 111, 253 S.W.2d 38, 40 (1952). Article
732(a) was enacted after the case was originally decided, but on rehearing the judges
cited it as persuasive authority for their holding.
28. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.29 (1966).
29. E.g., Luna v. State, 387 S.W.2d 896, 898 (Tex. Crim. App. 1965) (cases filed,
but no convictions); Gibbs v. State, 385 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964) (misdemeanor offense-D.W.I.); Wardrope v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 305, 306, 340 S.W.2d
498, 499 (1960); Fleming v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 519, 520, 279 S.W.2d 340, 341
(1955) (indictment against prosecution witness); Dukes v. State, 161 Tex. Crim. 423,
425, 277 S.W.2d 710, 711 (1955) (misdemeanor).
30. Nichols v. State, 494 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). See also P.
MCCLUNG,

LAWYERS'

HANDBOOK

FOR

TEXAS

CRIMINAL

PRACTICE

235-36 (rev.

ed.

1973) (a good selection of cases as to remoteness of the conviction).
31. E.g., Wood v. State, 486 S.W.2d 359, 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Pope v.
State, 65 Tex. Crim. 51, 54, 143 S.W. 611, 613 (1912).
32. E.g., Jackson v. State, 482 S.W.2d 864, 867-68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (racial);
Blake v. State, 365 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963); Wilson v. State, 71 Tex.
Crim. 330, 333, 158 S.W. 1114, 1116 (1913) (family relationship).
33. E.g., Seal v. State, 496 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) (police search
for drugs); Barr v. State, 128 Tex. Crim. 652, 654, 83 S.W.2d 998, 999 (1935) (fear);
Kissinger v. State, 126 Tex. Crim. 182, 184, 70 S.W.2d 740, 742 (1934) (release from
prison).
34. E.g., Morris v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 275, 276, 211 S.W. 7184 (1919) (pecuniary
gain); Tachini v. State 59 Tex. Crim. 55, 59, 126 S.W. 1139, 1141 (1910) (bounty).
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tions, s5 did not extend this rule to bias impeachment involving the introduction of pending charges. Texas strictly adhered to the limitations on impeachment as set out in article 732(a) and article 3 8.2936 although a few early de7
cisions recognized the right to use pending charges in bias impeachment.3
The absence of any relevant decisions between 1917 and the adoption of article 732(a) in 1951 can be attributed to the minority rule Texas was following
which allowed character impeachment by evidence of pending charges. After
1951, when adoption of bias impeachment through introduction of pending
charges would have been appropriate, the courts instead chose to strictly interpret articles 732(a) and 38.29 to mean that pending charges were inadmissible and could not be used in any manner of impeachment against a witness
not a party to the prosecution.3 8 Thus, the courts failed to adopt the majority
view on bias impeachment and recognize the separate lines of attack of a witness' credibility and the relationship of criminal records to each.
It was not until 1975 in Evans v. State 9 that the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals recognized bias impeachment through the use of pending charges.
Davis v. Alaska,40 decided a year earlier, was primarily responsible for that
decision. In Davis, the United States Supreme Court considered whether the
Confrontation Clause 41 required that a defendant be allowed to impeach the
credibility of a prosecution witness by cross-examination directed at bias derived from the witness' vulnerable status as a probationer, when such impeachment would conflict with a state statute precluding such inquiry. 42 De35. Cases cited note 16 supra.
36. Gaines v. State, 481 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); accord, Locke

v. State, 453 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (although witness allowed to be
asked if he had any interest in the case, jury had no idea that charges were pending
against him); Hall v. State, 402 S.W.2d 752, 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (witness under indictment for theft and in jail at time of trial; defense attempted to show motive
and interest of witness in testifying for prosecution to reduce charges against him); Scarborough v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 83, 87, 344 S.W.2d 886, 889 (1961) (trial court refused
to allow defense to introduce evidence of federal indictments against witness although
defense made it clear it only wanted to show bias); cf. Smith v. State, 516 S.W.2d 415,
420 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (although mere fact of arrest or indictment of witness not
normally admissible for impeachment purposes to show bias, interest, motive or animus,
where evidence arises out of same transaction for which defendant is on trial, it may
be admissible for impeachment of the witness).
37. Jones v. State, 81 Tex. Crim. 230, 232, 194 S.W. 1109, 1110 (1917) (witnesses
charged with different offenses than defendant and it appeared not from the same transaction); O'Neal v. State, 66 Tex. Crim. 460, 464-65, 146 S.W. 938, 940-41 (1912) (wit-

ness under similar charge of bootlegging, but not from same transaction).
38.
39.
40.
41.

Cases cited note 36 supra.
519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
415 U.S. 308 (1974).
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

42. The prosecution witness was a 17 year-old juvenile who was on probation
for burglary. Alaska had a statute, ALAS. STAT. ANN. § 47.10.080(g) (1971), and a
juvenile procedure rule, ALAS. R. CHiLD. P. 23 (1963) that protected the confidentiality

of a juvenile's past criminal record.
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fense counsel attempted to introduce evidence of the probation to show bias
on the part of the witness who possibly was motivated by fear of probation
revocation. 43 The trial court refused to allow cross-examination for bias, cit-

ing the Alaska statute, and the Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed. 44 The
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State's policy interest
in the statute must yield to the vital constitutional right of cross-examination
of an adverse witness for bias. 45 The Court further stated that the denial
of the right to effective cross-examination was "constitutional error of the first
magnitude and no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it
" .46Davis effectively rendered article 38.29 unconstitutional in light of
past interpretations which placed restrictions upon the right to cross-examine
47

for bias.
In reaching its decision in Evans, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted the
similarity of facts in Evans and Davis. These cases involved crucial prosecution witnesses that gave critical testimony and although the witnesses were
not parties to the respective crimes, they possibly could have been linked to
them. 48 Both were vulnerable to prosecution pressure 49 and Texas and
Alaska each had statutes which limited cross-examination for bias impeachment. Under the circumstances, Texas could not ignore the Davis mandate
to expand cross-examination of adverse witnesses in the area of bias
impeachment.
The effect of Evans was to find article 38.29 constitutionally sound through
judicial construction of the statute, so that Texas now follows the majority
of jurisdictions allowing bias impeachment by evidence of pending charges.
This judicial expansion of the text of the statute to include bias impeachment
is sufficient, in and of itself, to hold that the statute is constitutionally sufficient
in light of the Davis decision. 50
43. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 311 (1974). Green, the prosecution witness,
could have been under pressure to shift suspicion away from himself since the stolen
property was found near his property coupled with the fact he was on probation for burglary at that time.
44. Id. at 311.
45. Id.at 320.
46. Id. at 318, quoting Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966). The Court, for
emphasis, went into a detailed explanation in distinguishing character and bias impeachment and the use of criminal records in each. Id. at 316.
47. Cases cited note 36 supra.
48. Knock, the witness in Evans, was of the same build as one of the defendants
that had not been positively identified. Further, Knock had many of the same articles
of clothing and could wear them interchangeably with the defendant who had not been
positively identified. In a sense then, Knock could have been a suspect. In Davis, the
stolen safe was found near Green's property.
49. Green, the witness in Davis, was on probation for an unrelated burglary and
Knock was under indictment for sodomy.
50. Cf. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354-62 (1964). Legislative reform of the impeachment statute is necessary, however, to reflect the judicial construction of Evans. A new statute or amendment must distinguish between using final con-
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It should be noted that the Evans decision does not extend the right of
the accused to cross-examine and impeach all adverse witnesses for bias.
Presumably it is limited to situations where the witness is material and
delivers vital testimony against the accused. In Evans, the test of a principal

witness delivering vital information was clearly met although not explicitly
stated in the opinion. By comparing the case of Mutscher v. State5 ' with
Evans, the manner in which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals construes
Davis becomes evident. Clearly, bias impeachment52 through the use of pending charges will not extend to all adverse witnesses.
The Evans decision does not represent a return to the pre-1951 Texas decisions which permitted pending charges for impeachment of general character.
Mr. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Davis v. Alaska,5 3 noted the

limited scope of the Court's holding. Evans v. State5 4 remained within that
holding by not extending pending charges to characterimpeachment but staying in the realm of bias impeachment.
The effect of Evans on the rights of an accused where a State's material
witness has pending charges against him is clear. The accused can now more
effectively cross-examine the witnesses against him to the point where he may
at least present the possibility of bias or motive to the jury. Evans is not
as advantageous for prosecutors because their witnesses within this category
are no longer "sheltered." The credibility of a witness for the State surely
will be damaged by the opportunity of the jury to weigh any previous criminal
victions for character impeachment and using indictments, informations, or complaints
for bias impeachment. During any statutory reformation, the legislature should consider
the scope of bias impeachment and whether it should be extended to all adverse witnesses or limited solely to material witnesses.
51. 514 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In Mutscher the accused, citing
Davis, attempted to show bias on the part of one of the prosecution witnesses by introducing into evidence federal indictments pending against the witness. The court refused
to allow introduction of the indictments into evidence stating that the witness was not
a key witness nor did he contribute any vital information not already before the court.
Id. at 921.
52. Such a limitation is valid as against the Confrontation Clause. Although crossexamination should have the largest possible scope, the trial judge should have discretion
in determining the scope of cross-examination for bias. The impeachment for bias of
any adverse witness with pending charges, without regard to the relevancy or importance
of his testimony to the crime of the accused, not only seems without purpose, but falls
into the category of witness harassment and humiliation of which the United States Supreme Court spoke in Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). This discretion
extends to "a duty to protect [the witness] from questions which go beyond the bounds
of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humilate him." Id. at 694. Denial of impeachment for bias, by the trial court, of a nonessential witness would not
constitute reversible error since the accused's case would not be prejudicially harmed by
the refusal to admit into evidence the pending charges against the witness. This is
otherwise known as the "harmless error" rule. Compare Harrington v. California, 395
U.S. 250 (1969) and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 268 (1967) with Burgett v.
Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 115 (1967) and Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 91-94 (1963).
53. 415 U.S. 308, 321 (1974).
54. 519 S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
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